

December 21 1949

Report on the Four Papers

submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence

by the Special Assistant to the Sec. State
for Research & Intelligence
on Aug 2, 1949.

- I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities
- II. Production of Nat. Int.
- III. Research and Reports
- IV. Political Summaries

STATE'S FOUR PAPERS

("COAPS" is substituted for "ICAPS" throughout this paper
after 1 October 1949)

BACKGROUND STATEMENT

1. On 2 August 1949, Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State *for Research and Intelligence*, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence four papers containing recommendations for implementation

"at the earliest feasible time," which he wished to have considered by

the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

The DCI submitted copies of these papers to the 14 Members by circular memorandum dated Aug. 5, 1949.

2. A preliminary examination of the State proposals was made within CIA prior to the *Intelligence Advisory Committee* IAC Meeting of 19 August 1949 *at which* ~~was~~ it was

decided "to pass (the four papers) on to the Standing Committee to see what can be worked out and refer them back to the IAC Members."

3. On 24 August 1949, the State Department member of ICAPS met with Mr. Allen Evans to clarify certain aspects of the presentation made by the State Department.

4. On 30 August the IAC Standing Committee met to consider the State Department proposals. The goal of this meeting, which was not realized, was to evaluate the State recommendations and express Standing Committee indorsement or lack of indorsement on each one. Much discussion of substantially differing viewpoints dissipated progress at this meeting.

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5. On 8 September 1949 the IAC Standing Committee met, ^{again} to consider a draft of a report to the IAC ^{on the} on State Department's Problem I - Coordination. At the outset of this meeting the ~~NME~~ ^{US Defense} members submitted a prepared paper expressing their views on the Department of State proposals. Basically the ~~NME~~ ^{US Defense} paper supported many of the State recommendations and asked that the entire series of problems be examined minutely and suggested solutions be offered by ICAPS.

^{A report on these problems was prepared as a result of this discussion,}
6. ^{and} On 1 November 1949 the Director of Central Intelligence sent to the IAC two reports - one, ^{of which} concurred in by all the Standing Committee except the State member, who recommended in ^{the second} a separate short report that the proposals of the Department of State be referred to COAPS "for preparation of a staff study which will:

- (a) "clearly indicate the areas of agreement and
 - (b) "isolate and define the issues and areas on which
- there is disagreement."

7. ~~The Department of State recommendation for~~ ^A staff report by COAPS on the Four Problems of State met with the indorsement of the IAC members in response to the DCI memorandum of 1 November 1949.

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PROBLEM I - COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

State Recommendation 1:

"That COAPS serve as a joint staff under the direction of, and responsible to, the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis, but not 'representing' the agency, and be headed by a chief who will also be the Executive Secretary of the IAC."

Discussion:
CIA Comments:

This recommendation describes the present situation as regards the Chief of COAPS and the member from the Department of State. The "joint staff" concept should be clearly established in the case of the members contributed by the military departments. The words "Executive Secretary" should be changed, however, to "Secretariat" to cover the staff work essential for promoting efficiency at the IAC meetings and at the same time to prevent conflict with the concept of single loyalty in operations to the Director of Central Intelligence.

Conclusions:

The functions of COAPS, as part of the CIA organization, have been established and clearly enumerated by the Director of Central Intelligence.

These duties cover the viewpoints expressed by the Department of State.

However, efforts should be made by the DCI to have the military establishment recognize their designees to COAPS as full-fledged members of the Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Recommendations:

1. That a memorandum from the DCI to the IAC Members indicate

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staff work on all problems being brought to the attention of the IAC.

2. That the DCI take appropriate action with the Department of Defense to clarify the status of the military members of COAPS so that they do not operate in a "representative" capacity.

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State Recommendation 2:

"That matters of coordination be referred to COAPS for study and recommendation by the DCI, or through the DCI by the IAC, but that COAPS itself may submit to the DCI, or through the DCI to the IAC, recommendations which it considers appropriate for consideration."

Discussion
CIA Comments:

This recommendation describes accurately a relationship whereby *inherent* COAPS serves the DCI as a staff unit, recognizing that problems may be referred to the unit for staff study and that COAPS may itself initiate action when required.

Inherent in the wording of this recommendation ^{*honors*} is the Board of Directors' philosophy - giving little or no recognition to the ^{*principle of "forthright initiative and leadership"*} ~~forethought~~

~~and initiative~~ asked of the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of intelligence activities. *NSC 50 has confirmed that the IAC is to function as an advisory committee.*

Since this recommendation was written the thought has been presented by certain individuals at State that "matters of coordination" involving a jurisdictional problem between CIA and one of the IAC agencies should not be referred to COAPS for staff study, since COAPS would be biased as representing a party to the dispute. It is extremely

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difficult to find a problem in the field of coordination of intelligence
which does not in some way affect
activities directly or indirectly the organizational structure of CIA
and at least one of the IAC agencies.

CONCLUSIONS:

(Although Coaps works)
1. *(Though working)* as the staff unit of the DCI, the IAC agencies
intent
must recognize, if progress is to be achieved,

(a) that COAPS is the only permanently established unit of
organization available for staff analysis and formulation
of appropriate recommendations;

(b) that the DCI is not looking to COAPS for "yes" answers
unfavorable
on any problems under examination; *and that the agencies should not require similar partiality;*

(c) that COAPS, composed of individuals contributed by the
agencies *(to be coordinated)*, can and does achieve objectivity
in its evaluation of problems.

2. COAPS should assume more progressive initiative in exploring
areas of difficulty in the coordination process and in preparing
with out
adequately items for IAC consideration.

Recommendations:

1. That a memorandum be sent by the DCI to the IAC Members
notifying them that COAPS *(has been established in CIA and informing*
them of how this Staff will be used and) will be available to help

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appraise and recommend solutions to problems of intelligence coordination.

2. That COAPS assume responsibility for preparation of ^{the} items ^{to be} placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting and in so doing COAPS be guided by the principle that with adequate prior staff study it is not necessary that all such items be first referred to the Standing Committee before consideration by the IAC itself.

State Recommendation 3:

"That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee serve as a subordinate or staff committee to the IAC to consider on an interagency basis, problems referred to it by the IAC."

CIA Comments:

From a practical standpoint the IAC Standing Committee cannot serve the IAC as a "staff committee" since it has no permanent continuous working status. The main advantage of the existence of the IAC Standing Committee is the element of time-saving ^{to CIA} in securing ^{in round-table discussions} departmental viewpoints on interdepartmental problems. ^{Thus,} In producing staff studies for the IAC, COAPS ^{is enabled to} get agency reaction on these studies before putting them in final form for IAC ^{action} approval. ^{Hence,} Thus, the Standing Committee is the proving ground for testing the Staff Study, but in this process the Standing Committee should not be considered a barrier or layer between ~~(the office of)~~ the Director of Central Intelligence and the IAC. Accordingly, formality of

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procedure, demanding official actions such as motions and votes are non-essential in Standing Committee meetings. The adoption of parliamentary procedures in such meetings would serve no purpose since the *representatives of an Advisory Committee,* IAC Standing Committee can formulate no binding decisions.

Since meetings of any committee are non-productive unless some prior analysis is made of the problems to be discussed, the only items which the IAC should refer to the IAC Standing Committee "to consider on an interagency basis" are those upon which some staff work is already performed to clearly define the issue involved. This may have been done by the IAC agency introducing a particular problem. In most instances, however, problems requiring consideration "on an interagency basis," being beyond the pale of interest of any one department fall within the coordinating responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, and, as such, should be referred to him for adequate and proper consideration. In such "consideration" he will, of course, *without* test his tentative findings with the IAC before arriving at a decision.

The wording in the recommendation limits the kind of problems that the Standing Committee may consider, to those "referred to it by the IAC." This restriction serves no useful purpose.

Recommendations:

1. That the Recommendation of the Department of State be changed

to read as follows:

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"That the representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC, and that the Standing Committee consider all problems referred to it on an interagency basis so as to speed up the attainment of departmental views on interdepartmental issues."

2. That the Director of Central Intelligence issue an amendment to paragraph 6 of DCI 1/1 eliminating the necessity for arriving at "unanimous agreement" within the Standing Committee before referring a paper to the IAC for formal vote.

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State Recommendation 4:

"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility on research programs primarily through the Estimates Division, whose primary function should be such coordination, in accordance with the following principles:"

CIA Comments:

The primary function of any "Estimates Division" is to prepare intelligence estimates. Efficient work in this field will bring about a certain degree of coordination as a by-product. However, whether or not CIA establishes an organizational unit to be known as the "Estimates Division" is an internal decision to be made by the Director of Central Intelligence (without outside direct or indirect dictation.)

"Research," as such, is an undertaking very essential in producing an intelligence estimate and "research program" at the most is a segment of the total production function. CIA's coordinating responsibility goes far beyond the purview of just "research," embracing also

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(As to) how CIA carries on its coordinating responsibility is to be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence, and hence these "principles" of conduct are at the most suggestions for DCI to consider.

Conclusion:

Since the general subject being considered in State's first "Problem" is "Coordination of Intelligence Activities", the lead paragraph of Recommendation 4 should be reworded to express more accurately CIA's position.

Recommendations:

1. That it be recognized that the following principles are not all-inclusive.
2. Rewrite Recommendation 4 to read:
That State Recommendation 4 be reworded to read:

"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility in accordance with the following ^{primary} principles;"

First Principle

State Recommendation 4a:

"CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all U. S. foreign intelligence activities, including current research intelligence projects;"

Division
CIA Comments:

The word "activities" places a false limitation on the scope of CIA functions. Knowledge of "all U. S. foreign intelligence" is sufficiently general to include information on activities.

As a central producer of national intelligence and as a coordinator of all intelligence in the federal structure, CIA should be the recognized

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pertaining to
repository of all information ~~regarding~~ intelligence undertakings
and completed
planned, ~~and~~ in progress, in the IAC agencies.

To achieve this objective the IAC agencies themselves must take
maintaining strong
the initiative in ~~strengthening their~~ world-wide collection facilities
and in guaranteeing the free flow of raw information, finished depart-
mental products, and other pertinent data to the Central Intelligence
Agency.

Conclusion:

statement of
To comply with the mission of CIA, this principle should be
reworded so as to be more inclusive of CIA's total responsibility.

Recommendation:

- accepted if*
1. That the principle be reworded to read:

single agency
"CIA will constitute itself the center of information on all
U. S. foreign intelligence matters, including *agency* programs, projects, reports,
and activities of all types, *and also on the nature and scope* embracing knowledge of the basic
supporting data."

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Second Principle

State Recommendation 4b:

"CIA will have free access to the plans and programs of
the several intelligence agencies, subject to overall depart-
mental regulation;"

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CIA Comments:

CIA's authority to comprehend fully the agency intelligence activities and functions is circumscribed seriously by the present wording of NSCID 1, wherein it is specified that CIA may see only "intelligence materials" and these with the express permission of the department.

The last phrase of the principle "subject to overall departmental regulation" could hamper progress if it were applied too generally. There is no objection to its usage if meant to cover only the security regulations of each department and agency.

Conclusions:

1. The general acceptance of this principle by all IAC agencies would strengthen and facilitate the responsibility of CIA in the field of interdepartmental coordination.

2. The principle might well be clarified so that there will be no misunderstanding regarding the kind of departmental regulations which are meant to apply.

Recommendations:

1. That this principle be adopted by CIA for IAC application.
2. That the IAC agencies ^{*Members*} instruct their organizations in adequate detail regarding full recognition of this principle at all levels throughout each agency.

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Third Principle

State Recommendation 4c:

"CIA will recognize that it should have active liaison responsibility to other agencies as well as receiving liaison from those agencies;"

Discussion
CIA Comments:

The goal expressed by this recommendation is practical and worthwhile, and is a responsibility concomitant with the "free access" thoughts expressed in the last proposed principle. The "free flow" idea should be a two-way endeavor applicable to persons as well as materials and information. This interagency liaison should exist at policy levels as well as at working levels.

Conclusion:

The efficiency of present liaison functions between the IAC agencies and CIA is a subject worthy of proper examination.

Recommendations:

1. That CIA examine the condition of present liaison activities between CIA and the IAC agencies, and
2. Based upon the findings of such examination, issue the necessary operating instructions.

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Fourth Principle

State Recommendation 4d:

"CIA will effect coordination as much by positive action in stimulating appropriate intelligence effort as by negative action in preventing undesirable duplications;"

Review
CIA Comments:

This principle ties in with the "forthright initiative and leadership" concept *of the Dulles Report + NSC 50*, since its adoption by CIA and its unqualified recognition and acceptance by the IAC agencies would strengthen the administrative role of the Director of Central Intelligence in effecting coordination.

Conclusions:

1. The "positive action" approach is undoubtedly the more acceptable method for stronger coordination efforts.
2. To work properly, this principle must be accepted fully by *write out* the IAC agencies so as not to *raise a question of* clamor "interference" with departmental undertaking when the DCI takes action in overall planning to stimulate "appropriate intelligence" efforts in the agencies.

Recommendation:

That this principle be adopted to guide CIA's actions in all fields of coordination, after receiving agency guarantees of full cooperation.

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Fifth Principle

State Recommendation 4e:

"CIA will recognize that requests for intelligence other than national intelligence, as defined, shall be forwarded for action to the agencies in accordance with established allocations and existing programs;"

CIA Comments:

page for intelligence relating to the national security
Requests coming to CIA *and as such* from any source are not earmarked "national"

"departmental" or any other category. Neither does the requestor

specify that the desired intelligence estimate must be *prepared* worked upon

initially by any IAC department or agency. Accordingly, even though

the request on CIA may ask for an intelligence product which is *100%*

political *responsibility to the requestor is fully discharged by merely*
say, this does not mean that CIA ~~must~~ call upon the Department of the

State Navy for the production of the estimate. *Usually a* ~~any~~ departmental intelligence

estimate will not be allowed to go beyond the limits of the department

unless *(its)* ~~the policy officials concur in~~ *agreement policy.* the findings. Hence all depart-

mental intelligence products are framed in departmental policy view-

points, and, as such, lose their objectivity when judged by intelligence

standards.

however,
Regardless of this deficiency, ~~the~~ CIA ~~will~~ utilize departmental

intelligence products and ~~will~~ seek departmental concurrences in the

task of producing national intelligence estimates. The urgency of the

request will determine whether the work thereunder falls into the

category of "normal", "urgent" or "exceptional" as specified in

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Conclusions:

1. "National Intelligence, as defined" being the basis for this recommendation by the Department of State, we should give consideration *improving the definition* to a ~~redefinition~~ of National Intelligence to include therein concepts other than those which it now expresses.

2. The IAC agencies should be made to realize, (and then live up to the realization):

That CIA has no constitution, and no place in the Executive structure, as to enable national intelligence estimates to be prepared in a completely objective manner, without necessity for reference to established policy.
 (a) That CIA is the only intelligence agency in the entire federal structure that can produce estimates without policy bias, and hence with complete objectivity, and

in producing national intelligence estimates
 (b) Because of this important factor, CIA has ^{primary} responsibility for itself producing intelligence estimates even in fields ^{of dominant interest} which are allocated by directive to the departments.

Recommendations:

1. That NSCID 3 be amended to include a new definition of National Intelligence *as indicated in this report.* which will include CIA's thoughts.

2. That DCI 3/1 and DCI 3/2, ^{then} be scrutinized in the light of an amended NSCID 3 ^{for} to see if proper emphasis and meaning ~~is expressed in~~ keeping with the new definition.

~~SECRET~~Sixth PrincipleState Recommendation 4f:

"CIA will recognize that coordination also implies assistance to the agencies in meeting their responsibilities, including in some cases the temporary assignments of personnel to the agencies."

CIA Comments:

The suggested norm that "coordination also implies assistance" is an unsound thought for general application. There may be, and have been exceptional instances, when it was ~~not~~ expedient ~~(in the interest of producing national intelligence)~~ to give the departments and agencies ~~some financial aid~~ ^{personnel or} financial aid. The NIS program is an example of this type. However, it must be recognized clearly that this help was not to be considered a precedent for other undertakings, but was rather an exception to the normal operating practices of CIA.

*Revised admission
to include
this*

The only saving factor in the proposed principle is the unwitting ~~admittance~~ ^{admission} by the Department of State of the influence CIA has or could have in helping them to meet "their responsibilities." "He who holds the purse strings calls the tune."

Conclusion:

This principle should be ~~totally disregarded and~~ rejected as a substantially unsound interpretation of the function of coordination.

Recommendations:

1. That CIA non-concur in this principle and

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2. Whenever an IAC agency is given financial assistance by CIA

it should be understood clearly that a particular purpose is to be

served by such act, and that CIA does not ~~possess a bottomless financial~~

and should not pretend to direct to take care of
reservoir for the benefit of the IAC agencies.

anything and IAC agency cases of this nature.

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PROBLEM II - PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

State Recommendation 1a:

"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:

"a. That national intelligence applies only to intelligence which is interdepartmental in substance;"

Comments:

This recommendation expresses the State viewpoint on the fundamental differences between State and CIA regarding the production of national intelligence. CIA ^{feels} ~~contends~~ that national intelligence cannot be defined exclusively in terms of being interdepartmental in substance, ^(based on the NatSec. Act of 1947) but that the definition must embrace also the thought that any intelligence ^(regardless of category) "relating to the national security" is national intelligence, for which the Director of Central Intelligence, as the sole objective producer of intelligence in the federal government, not hemmed in by departmental policy prejudices, must assume full production responsibility.

In examining the present ~~incomplete~~ definition of National Intelligence in NSCID 3 many are prone to overlook the second and shorter definition of National Intelligence appearing in paragraph 4 of NSCID 1, wherein it is stated:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence."

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Conclusions:

1. The viewpoint expressed in this recommendation is too narrow to cover the essential components of National Intelligence, and
2. The Director of Central Intelligence should not concur in the concept that this recommendation be placed before the IAC for agreement.

Recommendations:

1. That the ^{State} recommendation be rejected as inapplicable and inappropriate, ^{as it fails to recognize the responsibilities imposed by law.} and
2. That necessary steps be taken by CIA to insure, with the backing of the NSC, that all IAC agencies see eye to eye on the proper meaning of National Intelligence.

State Recommendation 1b:

"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:

"b. That national intelligence should be developed with a maximum use of departmental facilities and minimum duplication of departmental intelligence activities;"

CIA Comments:

This recommendation completely overlooks the fact that much of the "duplication of departmental intelligence activities" exists between departmental agencies themselves. Though "duplication," as construed generally, is a wasteful endeavor, the thought should never be used when applied to intelligence production without being modified by the

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undesirable
word "unnecessary." Though each agency of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, including the Central Intelligence Agency, has had allocated to it by National Security Council Directive a ~~specific~~ field of dominant interest, "it is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope (underscoring supplied) than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might indicate."

A second grave weakness in the recommendation is that the words "maximum use of departmental facilities" convey the erroneous notion that each department should prepare "its" section of a national intelligence estimate, or that national intelligence is merely the combining of departmental intelligence products.

principle
The ~~goal~~ that CIA should recognize the departmental facilities and should look to them for assistance whenever possible is worthwhile as long as this is done in realistic manner.

Conclusions:

1. This recommendation should not be accepted as written until the IAC agencies understand and accept uniformly the redefined ~~definition~~ *meaning* of "National Intelligence."

2. The IAC agencies should recognize that National Intelligence is not merely the editing and joining of departmental products, neither

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is it just the blending and merging of departmental viewpoints but rather ^{is} an overall objective evaluation analysis which transcends the competency, capacity, and policies of any ~~and all~~ departments of government.

C/A

3. ~~We~~ should never subscribe to any recommendation or principle which overlooks the reality that "duplication" in the intelligence field, when within reasonable bounds, is more a blessing than a curse because of the adage that "Two minds are better than one."

Recommendations:

1. That CIA not accept this recommendation until the basic problem of ~~formulating a new definition for~~ ^{of} "National Intelligence" is solved.

2. That even then this recommendation be rewritten before acceptance so that:

(a) "Duplication" be modified to read "^{undesirable} unnecessary duplication," and

(b) The "^{undesirable} unnecessary duplication" concept be understood to apply ^{among} ~~between~~ the IAC agencies themselves as well as to the relationship between CIA and the agencies.

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3. That the IAC agencies understand clearly that any such recommendation as this lays a positive burden on the agencies themselves to expedite an efficient and complete "free flow" of departmental raw information and finished intelligence products to the Central Intelligence Agency.

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State Recommendation 1c:

"1. That IAC agree with respect to the production of national intelligence estimates:

"c. That except in crisis situations no step be taken in the preparation of national estimates before consultation with appropriate agencies."

CIA Comments:

This recommendation misplaces the emphasis completely of the basic fact that the Central Intelligence Agency is the SOLE unit of government charged with the production of National Intelligence. In carrying out this function CIA ~~does not~~ ^{cannot} seek direct or indirect prior permission or approval from any of the IAC agencies. CIA assumes full responsibility for the content and format of all national intelligence estimates, and hence CIA ^{fact} determines the mode to follow in the production of each such estimate.

However, CIA acknowledges the benefit to be achieved by tapping agency facilities, ~~whenever circumstances permit~~, and DCI 3/1 establishes clearly what shall be done in "normal," "urgent" and "exceptional" circumstances to seek agency participation in the production of national intelligence estimates.

*Agency participation in Crisis Situations
is in the process of being formalized.*

Conclusions:

1. To follow this recommendation would put fetters on the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, by subordinating the

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function of producing National Intelligence to the policies and procedures of the departmental activities.

2. In showing the proper spirit of cooperation with the IAC agencies, CIA has already gone further than the exception called for in this recommendation by asking for departmental comments even in "crisis situations." *(This is in the newly proposed DCI Directive,)*

3. To meet its deadline for furnishing a national intelligence estimate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, the Central Intelligence Agency cannot be dependent upon departmental promises of completion which are subject to the ~~whim and~~ determination of departmental policy officials.

Recommendations:

1. That this ^{State} recommendation be ~~(totally)~~ rejected as being completely at variance with the mission and objectives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. That after "National Intelligence" has been ^{and criticized,} ~~adequately redefined~~ the IAC agencies ^{recognize} ~~(be made to) realize more~~ ^{fully} ~~correctly~~ their position in the development of the national intelligence products.

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State Recommendation 2:

"That the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or upon the request of a member."

CIA Comments:

This recommendation has two major weaknesses:

(a) The IAC is looked upon as a Board of Directors to assume ultimate responsibility for the content of CIA's products - i.e., National Intelligence estimates, and

(b) The recommendation is contrary to the conclusions of the NSC with respect to the Dulles Report. ~~The~~^{SO} NSC stated that the Director and the IAC should not be bound by the concept of collective responsibility because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned.

Furthermore, there is no cogent reason why it should always be necessary to discuss dissents at IAC Meetings. The controlling factor for discussing national intelligence estimates at IAC Meetings should be the importance attached to the need for such discussion by any member of the IAC, rather than the ^{mere} existence of a difference of opinion as to the conclusions of the estimate.

We must recognize, however, that our present system on agency

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concurrences does not achieve the same end as would be derived by simultaneous collective discussion. Thus, some sympathetic consideration should be given to the fact that collective discussions, ~~if~~ [✓] adequately staffed ~~and~~ ^{might, if adequately staffed,} ~~and~~ ^{may} gently directed, rather than bringing out a weak "common denominator" of thought, ~~may~~ ^{might} add to the potency of the majority findings, ~~may~~ ^{might} eliminate minority dissents without weakening the major conclusions, or ~~may~~ ^{might} evolve new and even strengthened judgments on the premise under consideration.

Conclusions:

1. The recommended action is too broad and sweeping in calling ^{without} for IAC discussion on "all national intelligence estimates upon which there is substantial disagreement....."

2. IAC discussion should not be discouraged, but should be premised on the need as desired by any one member rather than on the existence of a substantial dissenting opinion.

Recommendations:

1. That the State recommendation be reworded to read:

"That the IAC discuss estimates upon the request of a member" *

2. That the recommendation as reworded be accepted.

* Recommend adding "---- a member; provided that, in the opinion of the requesting member, there is a substantive and important fault in the estimate to be discussed."

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State Recommendation 3:

"That COAPS review and make recommendations for any revision of procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates in crisis situations, such procedures to be, as far as possible, in accordance with the principles outlined in existing NSCID's, NSC 50 and Recommendation 1 above."

Discussion
CIA Comments:

COAPS ~~has~~ studied the need for a formal procedure to govern in crisis situations, and ~~has~~ already drafted and sent to the IAC agencies

a proposed DCI on this subject. *The Army and some other members wished to have the Army's phraseology as an amendment to NSCID No. 1, so the agreed-upon substance has been referred to the NSC to determine the method of issuance.*

Conclusion:

It is thought that
~~This action by COAPS is sufficient to comply with the objective~~
of the State recommendation *has now been reached.*

Recommendation:

That the IAC agencies expedite the approval of the ~~COAPS~~ *CIA* proposal on "Crisis Situations."

No further action is required until a reply is received from the NSC

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PROBLEM III - RESEARCH AND REPORTSState Recommendation 1:

"That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only in fields of common concern, as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC."

CIA Comments:

This recommendation conflicts with the view contained in 4e of State Paper I, which says that CIA will accomplish nothing beyond what is known as "National Intelligence." If "National Intelligence" is redefined in adequate fashion this State recommendation would apparently cause no restrictive limitation on the production responsibility of CIA. However, "appearances are sometimes deceptive" and such would be the case in this instance. The Director of Central Intelligence does not have authority to prescribe fields of common concern, ^{nor} Neither does the IAC ~~(have any function to advise the DCI in this regard.)~~ The National Security Act is most specific in stating that CIA shall "perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;" and furthermore that CIA shall "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." (Underscoring supplied.) The recommenda-

tion also restates the "Board of Directors'" philosophy ^{is completely} so prevalent ~~in much of the State thinking process~~

(in much of the State thinking process) that the Central Intelligence

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without and under the
Agency shall undertake what is prescribed by the IAC.

Conclusions:

1. This State recommendation is too restrictive as the Director of Central Intelligence must comply with requests from the President, the National Security Council, and others.

2. This State recommendation is erroneous in content by ascribing a responsibility to the DCI and the IAC which belongs, by law, to the National Security Council.

Recommendation:

1. That the State recommendation be rejected, *in its entirety.*

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State Recommendation 2:

"That, on a priority basis, COAPS prepare for consideration in IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern."

Dynamic
Comments:

The "fields of common concern" are those areas of production which do not fall *wholly* ~~specifically~~ into the allocated responsibility of any one department or agency. Thus under NSCID 3 "Economic, Scientific, and Technological Intelligence" are assigned to "Each agency in accordance with its respective needs."

Since the issuance of NSCID 3, a permanent interdepartmental Scientific Intelligence Committee has been established *after long delay* under DCI 3/3

"to plan, support and coordinate the production of scientific intelligence

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as it affects the national security." By this action ~~one segment of~~ *the scientific and technological*

"fields of common concern" ~~has~~ *have* not only been delineated, but ~~has~~ *have* also

been put under ~~adequate~~ *(adequate)* coordination control.

Conclusions:

1. Best coordination in fields of common concern is not achieved by mere "delineation" of the fields.

2. Continuous problems of coordination exist in those fields.

3. The precedent of ~~the~~ *establishing* the Scientific Intelligence Committee ~~establish-~~
~~ment~~ should carry much weight in considering problems in the economic intelligence field.

4. Because of vaster scope and more complexities in the economic field there is even greater justification for establishing an Economic Intelligence Committee.

Recommendations:

1. That the State recommendation be rejected as not affording a ~~solid~~ *true* solution in the Economic Intelligence field.

2. That there be established by ~~Directive of~~ *(person)* the Director of Central Intelligence a permanent interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of a representative of CIA, to plan, support and coordinate the production of ~~scientific~~ *economic* intelligence as it affects the national security and that such committee be known as "The Economic Intelligence Committee."

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PAPER - IV

Report

PROBLEM IV - POLITICAL SUMMARIES

State Recommendation 1:

"That COAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly."

Discussion:

As the intelligence facility of the National Security Council and the President, the Central Intelligence Agency must continually and systematically report all developments, political, economic, military, and otherwise, which materially affect or have a bearing upon United States national security and objectives abroad. While CIA's Daily and Weekly Summaries are based to a considerable degree upon Department of State materials, the major cause for this situation derives from the fact that the Department of State makes its highest level intelligence and operational materials, which have utility for intelligence purposes, available to the Central Intelligence Agency whereas the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air, ^{Force} normally do not provide operational details. It is hoped that this situation will be improved. Moreover, in periods of relative peace, the bulk of intelligence is of a political and economic, rather than military, nature. The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence summaries are the only ones designed primarily for the President and the National Security Council.

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Each departmental intelligence agency is authorized to produce such current publications as are required to meet its own departmental needs.

Conclusions:

The CIA Daily Summary and Weekly Summary are not designed to be only "political summaries." They are issued as current intelligence under Paragraph 1 of DCI 3/1.

Recommendations:

That the State recommendation be rejected.

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PROBLEM IV - POLITICAL SUMMARIES

State Recommendation 1:

"That COAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly."

Summary
CIA Comments:

from NSC 50 Report

The Central Intelligence Agency and most of the IAC agencies have intelligence summaries of some type. Undoubtedly, these have all been published for some specific purpose. In the field of coordination responsibility it would be well for CIA to examine all such publications periodically to evaluate the current need for the product, and to ascertain if improvement can be effected.

Conclusions:

from yellow sheet

(There is much merit in this State recommendation.)

2. This is definitely a function which falls squarely on CIA in its function to coordinate intelligence activities,

Recommendations:

1. That the State recommendation be accepted.
2. That COAPS embark on this project, reporting, of course, to the Director of Central Intelligence, before the matter is referred to the IAC for their consideration.

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Spec

Except for pages 25 and 26 this
appears to me to be an excellent
paper.

Reference pages 25 & 26, it is my opinion
that discussion of dissents by the IAC at the
request of any member would weaken the
position of the Director as being singly and fully
responsible for all CIA estimates.

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